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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-3558
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARQUETTA MITCHELL,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-11-cr-00116-004
District Judge: The Honorable Alan N. Bloch
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 9, 2013
Before: SMITH, ALDISERT, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 13, 2013)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Marquetta Mitchell pleaded guilty to two
counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 by attempting and conspiring to distribute and
to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms of crack cocaine. The plea

agreement contained a broad waiver of her right to appeal and to pursue collateral
relief. Thereafter, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania sentenced Mitchell to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’
imprisonment.
Despite the appellate waiver, Mitchell filed a notice of appeal the same day
that she was sentenced.1 Mitchell does not assert that the appellate waiver was
unknowing or involuntary. Nor does she argue that the issue she seeks to raise
falls outside the scope of the appellate waiver to which she agreed. And she does
not directly assert that enforcement of the appellate waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice. Rather, Mitchell contends that the appellate waiver “was
void from its inception” because it violated public policy. 2 Appellant’s Br. at 19.
If Mitchell succeeds in having the appellate waiver set aside, she also argues that
the District Court erred by finding that she failed to qualify for the safety-valve
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) by not making a timely, complete, and truthful
disclosure of all information and evidence concerning the offenses, which would
have permitted the District Court to depart below the mandatory minimum
sentence.3
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
The determination of whether an appellate waiver is valid presents an issue of law
subject to plenary review. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir.
2001).
3
We review a District Court’s factual finding under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) for
clear error. United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 752 (3d Cir. 1997).
1

2

In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001), the defendant
argued that his appellate waiver should be set aside as “contrary to public policy”
because a defendant cannot ever knowingly or voluntarily waive his “right[] to
appeal future errors.” We rejected that argument and held that “waivers of appeals
are generally permissible if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, unless they
work a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 558.
Nonetheless, Mitchell argues that appellate waivers are contrary to public
policy and should not be enforceable. She cites the ethical concerns that arise
when defense counsel advises a client about waiving a claim of ineffective
assistance or a prosecutor requires a waiver of the right to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.

See Advisory

Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (2009) (listing opinions). Indeed,
we have recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel may be a basis for setting
aside an appellate or collateral review waiver. See United States v. Shedrick, 493
F.3d 292, 298 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (declaring that “[e]nforcing a collateral-attack
waiver where constitutionally deficient lawyering prevented [a defendant] from
understanding his plea or from filing a direct appeal as permitted by his plea
agreement would result in a miscarriage of justice”); see also United States v.
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 n.9 (1st Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that the miscarriage of
justice concept is “infinitely variable, but, by way of illustration, we would include
within it situations in which appellants claim . . . that the plea proceedings were
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tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel”).
We decline to adopt the blanket rule Mitchell advocates for several reasons.
See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (“declin[ing] to adopt a blanket rule prohibiting all
review of certain otherwise valid waivers of appeals”). First, invalidating all
appellate waivers because of the ethical concerns pointed out by Mitchell would
“ignore[] that waivers of appeals may assist defendants in making favorable plea
bargains” as they “provid[e] defendants a valuable bargaining chip in the plea
process.” Id. Second, a blanket rule invalidating appellate waivers would fail to
account for the variance in the terms of appellate waivers and that some appellate
waivers may not preclude a defendant from raising an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See id at 562-63. Third, setting aside all appellate waivers based
on these ethical concerns would turn a blind eye to our jurisprudence recognizing
that a criminal defendant may thwart enforcement of an appellate waiver by
showing that the ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. See Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 298 & n.6. Fourth, Mitchell’s rule fails to
appreciate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally are not reviewed
on direct appeal. See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)). Finally, the ethical
concerns that arise from waiving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the
Missouri ethics opinion notes, do not “prohibit a defense counsel and prosecutor
from entering into a plea agreement that involves waiver of other post-conviction
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rights,” such as the right to appeal. Advisory Comm. of the Sup. Ct. of Mo.,
Formal Op. 126 (2009). Rather, we adhere to the case-by-case evaluation we
embraced in Khattak, which requires determining the validity of each appellate
waiver based on its terms and the circumstances in that case. See 273 F.3d at 563;
see also United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 2008) (instructing
that the “language of a waiver, like the language of a contract, matters greatly”).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the sentencing issue Mitchell
seeks to appeal, which does not allege the ineffective assistance of counsel, falls
within the scope of the appellate waiver to which she knowingly and voluntarily
agreed. In light of the circumstances of this case, enforcement of the appellate
waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we will enforce the
appellate waiver and will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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